Office Hours: Oak Hall 328; T,TH 8:30-9:30 and by appointment.

Contacts: phone 486 - 4070; e-mail Alanson.minkler@uconn.edu

Grading: Two midterms: 20 points each (40 points total). Comprehensive final examination: 30 points. Homework: three, at 10 points each. Mid term dates: October 9 and November 13. There are no make-up midterm exams; those who miss one midterm (with valid excuse) may weight the final as 50% of the course grade.

Note: This is a fairly difficult class, heavy on theory and algebra! No calculators will be permitted during exams, so please plan accordingly.

Grade Scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score Range</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90 -</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 - 89</td>
<td>A-</td>
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<tr>
<td>80 - 84</td>
<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 - 79</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>70 - 74</td>
<td>B-</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 - 69</td>
<td>C+</td>
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<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>C-</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>D+</td>
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<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>D-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Articles for the *Theory of the Firm* topic will be posted on HuskyCT.

Conduct and Cell Phones: The classroom is our academic community. In order to maintain mutual respect for each and every one of us, all cell phone use is prohibited. That means no text messaging. If you need to use your cell phone please leave the classroom quietly. Naturally, all University policies on Student Conduct, Integrity, and final examinations are in effect.
Topics and Reading List

Introduction and Microeconomics Review
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 3: Competition and Monopoly

Theory of the Firm
Chapter 2: The Firm and Its Cost
Readings posted on HuskyCT

Market Structure: Barriers to Entry, Concentration, and Correlates
Chapter 4: Market Structure
Chapter 5: Monopoly Practices
Chapter 6: Empirical Industrial Organization

Introduction to Game Theory
Chapter 7: Game Theory: A Framework for Understanding Oligopolistic Behavior

Early Models: Cournot-Nash; Stackelberg; Bertrand; and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Chapter 8: The Development of Theory
Chapter 9: Collusion: The Great Prisoner’s Dilemma
Chapter 10: Cartels in Action

Entry Deterrence
Chapter 11: Oligopoly Behavior: Entry and Pricing to Deter Entry
Chapter 12: Oligopoly Behavior: Entry and Non-pricing Strategies to Deter Entry

Topics
Chapter 13: Product Differentiation
Chapter 14: Advertising
Chapter 15: Technological Change and Research and Development
Chapter 17: Vertical Integration and Vertical Relationships
Chapter 18: Regulation and Deregulation